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In The Suprellle Court 
of the State of Utah 
L~\UREX "\Y. GIBBS, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
YS. 
E. E. :JIOXSOX, Secretary of State of 
the State of rtah, JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of the State of 
Utah, and RULON F. STABLEY, 
State Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah, as members of the 
Securities Commission of the State 
of rtah, and the SECURITIES 
CO~LJIISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 6331 
APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, 
HONORABLE ALLEN G. THURMAN, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 18, 1939, the Securities Commission 
revoked the registration of respondent as a dealer in 
securities, claiming to act under Sec. 82-1-21, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
On December 18, 1939, the respondent instituted an 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, pursuant to Sec. 82-1-41, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933. The complaint alleged, in addition to the 
formal allegations of jurisdiction: 
1. That the Utah Securities Commission issued an 
order to show cause which is set forth in the complaint 
(Abs. 2) and which stated that an information in writing 
had been filed with the Securities Commission but that 
plaintiff was not furnished the "information in writing" 
or any portion there,of or any information concerning the 
nature thereof. 
2. That a suspension order set forth in the com-
plaint (Abs. 3) failed to state facts sustaining the sus-
pension order and that the suspension order was issued 
contrary to law. 
3. That a bill of particulars was furnished to the 
plaintiff wherein and whereby the defendants became the 
complainants, the prosecutors, and the court, all com-
bined in one tribunal, in violation of the due process clause 
of the State and Federal constitutions. 
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4. That the so-railed bill of particulars and the so-
called amended bill of particulars failed to set forth facts 
sufficient to support the order to show cause and failed 
to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, 
and failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
for the suspension of the plaintiff and to constitute fraud 
or any violation of law. (Abs. 5, 7.) 
5. That at no time ,,~as the plaintiff informed as to 
the defendants' informant nor was he confronted with 
said informant or complaining witness. (.Abs. 5.) 
6. That the defendants were without jurisdiction 
to enter their final order of cancellation of November 
18, 1939, because all of the transactions therein mentioned 
pertained to securities expressly exempted by law, to-wit, 
municipal bonds, and contrary to and in violation of Sec. 
29, Art. 6 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 
constitute an isolated transaction expressly exempted 
from the defendant's jurisdiction by law. (Abs. 7.) 
7. That the Securities Commission failed to give 
the plaintiff a copy of the transcript of the evidence ad-
duced at the proceedings upon the demand made. (Abs. 7.) 
8. That Title 82 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, and particularly Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection (4), vio-
lates Article 5 and Sec. 1 of Article 6 of the Constitution 
of Utah, and constitutes a delegation to an administrative 
body and to the executive branch of the state government 
of powers and functions properly belonging and apper-
taining to the legislative department thereof. (Abs. 7.) 
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9. That the Commission at the time of its determin-
ation had before it a complete transcript of the evidence 
adduced by the Commission and did not have before it in 
transcript form the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. 
(Abs. 8.) 
10. That the findings of fact and conclusions made 
by the Securities Commission are in conflict with the 
evidence; that the conclusions are contrary to law and 
are not supported by the findings of fact and the evi-
dence; and that the order of cancellation is contrary t0 
law. (Abs. 8, 9.) 
11. That the plaintiff has committed no act which 
justifies the final order of cancellation, that the attorney 
general conceded that there \Yas no charge or evidence of 
actual fraud or intent to defraud. 
Plaintiff then prayed judgment ''setting aside and 
revoking the order of cancellation of registration entered 
by the defendants against the plaintiff on the 18th day 
of November, 1939, and that the defendants be required 
to return to this court a transcript of the proceedings 
had before it in the matter of the order to show cause 
issued to the plaintiff herein, as hereinbefore set forth, 
together with a transcript of the evidence adduced at the 
hearing upon said order to show cause, within the time 
allowed by law for the defendants to answer the com-
plaint of the plaintiff herein, and for such other and 
further relief as may be proper in the premises.'' (Abs. 
11.) 
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The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
Securities Commission were attached to the complaint as 
Exhibit "A". (Abs. 12-22.) 
The District Court then made an ex parte order that 
the defendants return to that Court a full and complete 
transcript of the proceedings had before the Commission, 
and that pending the determination of this cause and 
until the judgment of this Court becomes final the order 
of the defendants cancelling plaintiff's registration as a 
dealer in securities, dated November 18, 1939, shall be 
suspended and the right of plaintiff . to do business in. 
the State of Utah as a licensed dealer in securities shall 
continue. ( Abs. 23.) 
The defendants demurred generally that the com-
plaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action and that the Court has no jurisdiction of the 
subject _of the action: 
(a) For the reason that no notice of appeal had 
been given and no bond or security for costs ordered or 
posted. 
(b) For the reason that Title 82, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, authorizes no review of the proceedings 
of the Securities Commission. 
Defendants also demurred specially, setting forth 
the sole ground that the complaint is ambiguous, unin-
telligible and uncertain "in that it cannot be told there-
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from whether a new and independent action is sought 
to be instituted or whether a writ of review of the pro-
ceedings of these defendants against the plaintiff herein 
as described in said complaint is sought, or whether said 
complaint is intended to be an appeal from the order of 
these defendants in said proceedings.'' ( Abs. 24.) 
The defendants also moved to vacate the court order 
suspending the order of the Securities Commission. The 
demurrer was overruled and motion denied (Abs. 26), 
and defendants, standing on their demurrer and motion, 
appealed. ( Abs. 27-31.) 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants by their assignments raise two main 
questions: the content matter of the plaintiff's complaint 
(general demurrer in assignment IV); and the procedure 
requested by the plaintiff and followed by the district 
court (assignments I, II, III and IV, special demurrer). 
We shall discuss the content matter first and the pro-
cedural element second. 
I. The Plaintiff's Complaint Stated a Cause of Ac-
tion. (Assignment IV, general demurrer.) 
It is elementary that a general demurrer must be 
overruled if any part of the complaint states a cause of 
action (De La Y sla v. Publix The.atres Corporation, 82 
Utah, 528, 26 Pac. (2d) 818; Wright v. Intermountain 
Motor Car Company, 53 Utah 176, 177 Pac. 237; Sweet v. 
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Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 Pac.1167.) Even though 
this Court should find that part of the allegations of the 
complaint were superfluous, still if other parts state a 
cause of action the lower court properly overruled the 
general demurrer. \Ye submit that any one of the follow-
ing grounds alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause 
of action sufficient to support the overruling of a general 
demurrer. 
A. The complaint alleged that the Commission were 
wholly zcithont jurisdiction to enter their fimal order of 
cancellation because Title 82, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933: and particularly Sec. 82-1-21 Subsection ( 4) thereof, 
·is contrary to lau.· and is unconstitutional. (Par. 12-c of 
the complaint, Abs. 7.) 
Sec. 82-1-21 is that section which empowers the Com-
mission to cancel registration. It lists five grounds for 
the cancellation as follows: 
"Registration under sections 82-1-15 and 82-
1-17 may be refused, or any registration granted 
may be cancelled, by the commission, if after a 
reasonable notice and a hearing the commission 
determines that such applicant or registrant so 
registered : 
"(1) Has violated any provisions of this 
chapter or any regulation made hereunder; or, 
'' (2) Has made a material false statement 
in the application for registration; or, 
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" ( 3) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in 
connection with any sale of securities, or has been 
or is engaged, or is about to engage, in making 
fictitious or pretended sales or purchases of any 
securities, or has been or is engaged, or is about 
to engage, in any practice or sale of securities 
which is fraudulent or in violation of law; or, 
"'(4) Has demonstrated his unworthiness 
to transact the business of dealer, salesman or 
agent; or, 
" ( 5) Is insolvent." 
Only two of these grounds are named in the Com-
mission's order as a basis of the cancellation (.Abs. 3) : 
(1) That the plaintiff has been guilty of a fraudulent 
act; and, (2) That the plaintiff has demonstrated its 
''unworthiness'' to transact the business of a dealer in 
securities. 
The conclusions of law on which the order is based 
(Abs. 21), however, do not find any fraudulent act and 
leave ''unworthiness'' as the sole basis of the order of 
cancellation. This order, then, depends for its validity 
upon Subsection ( 4) of Sec. 82-1-21 of Revised Statutes, 
1933: Registration may be cancelled if the commission 
determines that the registrant "has demonstrated his 
unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer, sales-
man or agent.'' This section is unconstitutional. 
Article V of the Constitution of Utah reads as 
follows: 
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'•The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Ju-
dicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
nlents shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted.'' 
Sec. 1 of Article 6 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that the legislative power of the State shall be vested in 
the Legislature of the State of Utah. Subsection ( 4) of 
Sec. 82-1-21, of the Revised Statutes, 1933, is a delegation 
by the Legislature of legislative powers to an adminis-
trative body-a branch of the executive power-without 
any limitation upon the discretion and power of the 
Commission. This Court has held that such deleg~tion 
cannot be done. In Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 
Utah 404, 57, Pac. (2d) 734, the validity of Sec. 93-1-5, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, was questioned. This 
section provided that any person failing to affix certain 
cigarette stamps shall be required to pay as part of the 
tax a penalty of not less than $10.00, nor more than 
$299.00 for each offense, to be affixed and collected 
by the State Tax Commission. The State Tax Commis-
sion, after a hearing, placed a penalty of $250.00 on the 
plaintiffs. :1\;Ir. Justice Wolfe, in expressing the majority 
opinion holding the statute unconstitutional, said: 
"In this case, the Legislature gave the tax 
commission not only power to hear and deter-
mine whether a penalty should attach, but within 
the limits of from $10 to $299 to fix the penalty. 
The commission fixed it at $250. This involved 
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not only the function of determining whether a 
situation was such as would work an imposition 
of the penalty fixed or ascertainable by law and 
the function of imposing such penalty, but the 
function and power of determining the amount of 
the penalty. This involves not the question of 
whether the Legislature gave the tax commission 
a judicial rather than an administrative power 
(unless we accept the plaintiffs' contention that 
this power to determine the amount of the penalty 
is really fixing punishment for a crime), but the 
question of whether the Legislature could dele-
gate such power to determine the amount, in its 
discretion, to any tribunal as a matter of penalty 
imposed not as punishment for a crime but as a 
sanction to pay the tax. We think it could not do 
so. Giving to the tax commission the power to 
determine in its own judgment the amount of the 
penalty was a legislative function which could not 
be delegated. It is not the power to enforce or 
apply a law, but the power to make a law for 
each particular case, to determine in its judgment 
the amount of a penalty. We recognize the power 
to make reasonable rules and regulations and to 
make a failure to obey them involve a loss of 
rights either given by law or by the regulations 
themselves. But in this case there was no basis 
provided for the commission to ascertain the 
amount of the penalty by a mathematical compu-
tation, but the broad power to determine its 
amount within its discretion, from $10 up to 
$299 . . . The infirmity in 93-1-5 lies in the fact 
that the tax commission can in each case name a 
different sum. It has not set a standard for all 
cases which fit the rule, but in each case within its 
mind at its discretion fixes the amount. Only 
the courts in imposing a fine as a punishment for 
a crime have this discretion.'' 
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What standards does the Utah Statute set as a guide 
for our Securities Commission, so far as its action against 
the plaintiff is concerned~ None whatever. It states 
that the registration may be canceled if the Commission 
determines that the registrant so registered "has demon-
strated his unworthiness to transact the business of 
dealer, salesman, or agent." Unworthiness is not such 
a term as common law has defined or limited. It is new 
in the law. Its interpretation depends upon the wish and 
whim of the Commission. A man is unworthy if he does 
not meet standards which the Commission will have set 
up itself. The Commission may one day be in a mood 
to declare certain actions unworthy and on another day 
the same actions worthy. No guiding limitation is pres-
ent in the statute to prevent such a situation. The Com-
mission here is given a free hand, and can determine at 
will whether a registrant has demonstrated his "un-
worthiness." It must determine by its own standards 
what ''unworthiness'' means. 
In a long line of decisions, the U. S. Supreme Court 
has held the Constitution of the United States to require 
a separation of powers, under which the power to make 
regulations for administering the laws can be delegated 
by Congress. In all of these cases it was recognized 
that there were limits in this delegation; and, finally, in 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 
446, it was determined that the limits had been crossed. 
The reason for finding there that the Congress had 
delegated too much are set forth in the terse statements 
of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who said: 
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''As to the transportation of oil production 
in excess of State permission, the Congress has 
declared no policy, has established no standard, 
has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, 
no definition of circumstances and conditions in 
which the transportation is to be allowed or 
prohibited." 
In Schechter v. U. 8., 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 
the U. S. Supreme Court held that the N.R.A. Statute was 
an invalid delegation of legislative authority to adminis-
trative bodies. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for 
the court, said : 
''The Congress is not permitted to abdicate 
or to transfer to others the essential legislative 
functions with which it is thus vested. We have 
repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting 
legislation to complex conditions involving a host 
of details with which the National Legislature 
cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Pan-
ama Ref. Co. Case that the Constitution has never 
been regarded as denying to Congress the neces-
sary resources of flexibility and practicality, which 
will enable it to perform its function in laying 
down policies and establishing standards, while 
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making 
of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and 
the determination of facts to which the policy as 
declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we 
said that the constant recognition of the necessity 
and validity of such provisions, and the wide 
range of administrative authority which has been 
developed by means of them, cannot be allowed 
to obscure the limitations of the authority to 
delegate, if our constitutional system is to be 
maintained. Id. p. 421. 
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"Accordingly, we look to the statute to see 
whether Congress has overstepped these limita-
tions,-whether Congress in authorizing' Codes of 
Fair Competition' has itself established the stand-
ards of legal obligation, thus performing its es-
sential leg-islative function, or, by the failure to 
enact such standards, has attempted to transfer 
that function to others ... 
''To summarize and conclude upon this point : 
Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without prece-
dent. It supplies no standards for any trade, 
industry or activity. It does not undertake to 
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to par-
ticular states of fact determined by appropriate 
administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing 
rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes 
to prescribe them. For that legislative under-
taking, Section 3 sets up no standards, aside from 
the statement of the general aims of rehabilita-
tion, correction and expansion described in. Sec-
tion 1. In view of the scope of that broad declara-
tion, and of the nature of the few restrictions that 
are imposed, the discretion of the President in 
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting 
laws for the government of trade and industry 
throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. 
We think that the code-making authority thus con-
ferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power." 
The Illinois Court, 1n Chicagoland Agencies v. 
Palmer, 364 Ill. 13, 2 N. E. (2d) 910, held unconstitutional 
a section of an act very similar to the one involved in the 
case at bar and which reads as follows : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
''A certificate issued under this Act may be 
revoked and/ or a renewal thereof refused by the 
Director, if after due investigation and a hearing 
either before him or before any salaried employee 
of the insurance department de signa ted by him 
whose report he may adopt, he determines thai 
the holder of such certificate 
"(a) has violated any provision of the insur-
ance law; or 
"(b) has intentionally made a material mis-
statement in the application for such certificate; or 
" (c) has been guilty of fraudulent or dis-
honest practices ; or 
" (d) has demonstrated his incompetency or 
untrustworthiness to transact the insurance brok-
erage business.'' 
This section was declared unconstitutional because 
no standard of qualification was required of the person 
before whom the hearing was to be held and because no 
definition of the term ''due investigation'' was given, thP 
Court saying: 
''What does the term 'due investigation,' 
used in section 11, contemplate~ The director is 
left without restraint to interpret that phrase. It 
is possible that each succeeding director may 
place a substantially different meaning upon it. 
Even a salaried employee designated from time 
to time by the director might differ in his inter-
pretation of the term from that of some previous 
salaried employee so acting, as to the character 
and type of investigation to be heard on the in-
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quiry before him. It is significant that no charges 
are required to be filed under any of the four 
subdivisions of section 11. No provision is made 
for the giving of notice of such charge to the 
agent or broker under investigation so that he 
may know what accusation he is to meet, and pre-
pare his defense, if any; no place is fixed for the 
hearing nor the manner or the giving of notice 
thereof; no procedure is prescribed for the pro-
duction or consideration of the evidence, sub-
poenaing of witnesses, administering of an oath 
thereto, nor the preservation of the record. These 
usual and necessary incidents to a "'hearing,' as 
that term is commonly understood, are lacking, 
but the director alone, determines what manner 
of hearing will be had and the procedure to be 
followed. 
"An act to be valid, may not be vague, in-
definite, and uncertain, but must be complete when 
it leaves the Legislature and be sufficiently ex-
plicit to advise everyone what his rights are under 
it and how he will be affected by its operation ... 
''The powers attempted to be conferred upon 
the director are so arbitrary, unlimited, and unre-
strained that such powers are in direct conflict 
with the constitutional command that the Legisla-
ture may not delegate its legislative function to 
any person or body." 
In Malloy v. City of Chicago, 365 Ill. 604, 7 N. E. 
(2) 320, the statute provided that in cities of a certain 
population, policemen or firemen who have attained the 
age of 63 years ''shall be retired from active service 
upon the order of the head of the police or fire depart-
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ment of such city, as the case may be." The Court said, 
in holding this unconstitutional: 
"The objection to this act is that it is in-
complete and leaves the retirement of policemen 
and firemen to the whims of the head of these 
departments without rules to guide their action. 
It has frequently been held by this court that, 
while the method and manner of enforcing an act 
of the General Assembly must, of necessity, be 
left to the reasonable discretion of administrative 
. officers, yet a statute which vests in such officers 
a discretion, not only as to the administration of 
the act but also to determine what the law is, or to 
apply it to one and refuse its application to an-
other in like circumstances, is void, as an unwar-
ranted delegation of legislative authority.'' 
In Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457, the 
Wisconsin Court held invalid a Blue Sky law on the same 
ground, that the Legislature had failed to give standards 
to the administrative body. That act gave the power to 
the Commission to declare voidable any sale not made in 
conformity with the requirements of the Commission. 
The Court ~aid: 
"The difficulty with the statute is that it 
leaves it in the discretion of the Conlmission to 
say what shall happen. This clearly brings it 
within the condemnation of the decision in Borg-
nis v. Falk Co., supra, as a delegation of legislative 
power; the fact that it attempts to delegate to the 
Commission the power to make an award which 
shall be just and equitable without erecting any 
standard, but leaving it wholly within the discre-
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tion of the Commission, makes it a clear delega-
tion of judicial power using these terms in their 
commonest and best understood 1neaning. No 
refinements need to be indulged in in this case to 
show that the powers granted to the Commission 
are those which are vested by the Constitution 
respectively in the Legislature and the courts. 
Our attention is called to no case where a similar 
delegation of power has been sustained, where the 
act itself did not prescribe some standard by which 
the discretion of the Commission or other admin-
istrative body was to be controlled and measured.'' 
People v. Federal Surety Company, 336 Ill. 472, 168 
N. E. 401, declared unconstitutional the Illinois Securitie~ 
Act, requiring that no person should sell securities, unless 
registered with the Secretary of State, as owner, dealer, 
and broker. In condemning the statute giving the Secre-
tary of State authority to fix the bond, the decision said: 
'' 'The true distinction is between a delegation 
of power to make the law, which involves a discre-
tion as to what the law shall be, and conferring an 
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be 
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The 
first cannot be done; to the latter no objection 
can be made.' Examples of this distinction are 
found in the cases of People v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 
401, 28 N. E. 812, and Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 
150, 78 N. E. 52. It is apparent that section 23 
was not complete when it came from the Legis-
lature. No one can tell the amount of the bond 
required for the license as a dealer and broker 
in securities, or the conditions which it should 
contain, until the Secretary of State had fixed the 
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amount and the terms and conditions in each 
particular case, and the section fixed no rules 
which he should follow in determining these ques-
tions. The appellant"s objection to the constitu-
tionality of these requirements of the section 
should have been sustained.'' 
After that decision, the Illinois Legislature attempted 
to make its standards more precise in delegating power 
to the Secretary of State, and still failed, the Court say-
ing, People v. J. 0. Beckman & Co., 347 Ill. 92, 179 N. E. 
435: 
''The enactment of 1929 attempted to estab-
lish rules to serve as a guide to the secretary of 
state in fixing the amount of the bond. It sets 
out three factors which the secretary of state i~ 
to investigate and consider: First, the proposed 
method of transacting the business ; second, the 
financial standing of the applicant; and, third, the 
experience, ability and general reputation for in-
tegrity of the applicant, or if a corporation, of 
its officers, managers, and principal agents. This 
section does not fix a standard of qualifications or 
fitness for applicants. There is nothing to indi-
cate how much experience or ability or what 
amount of capital shall be necessary to justify 
the secretary of state in fixing the bond at the 
minimum amount and when the maximum amount 
shall be required. While the manner of executing 
a law must necessarily be left to the reasonable 
discretion of an administrative officer and the 
exercise of that discretion does not constitute the 
exercise of judicial power (ltalia America Ship-
ping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427, 154 N. E. 198), 
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yet in the absence of rules by which the adminis-
tra tiYe officer may be guided in the exercise of 
that discretion the law is incomplete. People v. 
Federal s~uety Co., supra; City of Chicago v. 
ll!atthies, 320 Ill. 352, 151 N. E. 248; People v. 
Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377. All of the 
guides given to the secretary of state for deter-
mining the amount of the bond leavetohimhis own 
interpretation and definition of the terms used in 
the statute. A law vesting discretionary power 
in an administrative officer without properly de-
fining the terms under which his discretion is to 
be exercised is void as being an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative power.'' 
The ~Iinnesota Court, in State v. Great Northern 
Railzcay, 111 N. "\Y. 289, held invalid the statute requiring 
a permit from the Commission for a railroad corporation 
to increase its capital stock, the Court saying: 
''The statute declares that before any such 
corporation shall increase its capital stock it shall 
apply to the commission in writing, setting forth 
the amount of the proposed increase and the 
purpose for which it is desired. The commission 
must then fix a time and place for hearing the 
matter and give notice thereof. Upon the hearing 
the commission must make a finding of the facts 
established in reference to the proposed increase. 
What must they then do1 Must they allow the 
increase if they find that 'the amount of the pro-
posed increase and the purpose for which it is 
desired' are such as are authorized by law~ 
Certainly not. There is no such provision in the 
statute. The language of the statute cannot by 
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any fair or permissible construction be so read. 
On the contrary, the language used is: If they 
allow it (the application for an increase of stock), 
they shall prescribe the manner in which and the 
terms upon which the same shall be made. If 
they disapprove of such increase, the reasons 
therefor shall,be stated in their next annual re-
port. Nor shall the capital stock of any such 
corporation be increased, except by special author-
ity of such commission. The prescribing 'the 
manner in which and the terms upon which' the 
capital stock of railway corporations may be in-
creased is a legislative power, not an administra-
tive duty, and cannot be delegated. And yet this 
is just what the Legislature attempted to do by 
this statute, unless the words we have quoted can 
be read out of it, and the omitted provisions we 
have indicated be read into it, by construction. 
It is only by arbitrarily so construing the statute 
that we can hold that it authorizes the commission 
to supervise the issuance of only such stock 
as is authorized by law, and to charge them with 
the duty of ascertaining in each case whether the 
proposed increase is for an authorized purpose 
and in accordance with the requirements of the 
law.'' 
The Supreme Court of California, in Hewitt v. Board 
of Medical Examiners of the State, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 
39, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 Ann. 
Cases, 750, held the term ''grossly improbable state-
ments,., in the statute too indefinite to permit the Board 
of Medical Examiners to cancel a physician's license. This 
Court said: 
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''Under this provision the penalty of forfei-
hue of a physician's license is not made to depend 
upon falsity in fact of any matter contained in 
a statement, or knowledge on the part of the phy-
sician that it is false, or for the reason that it was 
intended or had a tendency to deceive the public, 
or to impose upon credulous or ignorant persons 
and so be harmful and injurious to public morals, 
health, and safety. It is a matter of no moment 
under the provision of the act, and is entirely im-
material whether the statement is true or false, 
beneficial or injurious. If, in the opinion of the 
board, the statement is 'grossly improbable,' the 
certificate to practice is to be revoked. The right 
of the physician to be secure in his privilege of 
practicing his profession is thus made to depend, 
not upon any definition which the law furnishes 
him as to what shall constitute 'grossly improb-
able statements,' but upon the determination of 
the board after the statement is made and simply 
upon its opinion of its improbability. No definite 
standard is furnished by the law under this pro-
vision whereby a physician with any safety can 
advertise his medical business; nor is there any 
definite rule declared whereby after such adver-
tisement is had the board of medical examiners 
shall be controlled in determining its probability 
or improbability.'' 
In Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241, 89 N. 
E. 245, the ·Massachusetts Court held that an ordinance 
providing that no person should occupy, use or maintain 
any building for the purpose of packing, sorting or stor-
ing rags without a permit in writing from the chief of 
the fire department was invalid because there was noth-
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ing in the ordinance to guide him in passing upon the 
applications that might be made to him. 
In State of Washington v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 
296, 193 Pac. 845, the Washington Court held invalid an 
ordinance which provided that the license could be '' re-
voked by the commissioner of public safety in his discre-
tion for disorderly or immoral conduct or gambling on 
the premises, or whenever the preservation of public 
morality, health, peace, or good order shall in his judg-
ment render such revocation necessary.'' 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Eureka City v. Wilson, 
15 Utah 67, 48 Pac. 150, held that the following ordinance 
was an unlawful delegation of legislative power: 
"provided, that any person desiring to erect a 
building of other material than those above speci-
fied within said fire limits, shall first apply to the 
committee on buildings within said fire limits of 
the city for permission so to do, and if the consent 
of the committee on building within said fire 
limits shall be given, they shall issue a permit, 
and it shall thereupon he lawful to erect such 
building under such regulations and restrictions 
as the committee on building within said fire 
limits may provide.' '' 
The Utah Securities Commission by the subsection 
( 4) challenged in the complaint is given as much liberty 
to set the standards of ''unworthiness' as the commis-
sions in the cases just quoted, which could set the stand-
ards, dismiss policemen and firemen at will, set the 
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amount of a bond at will, determine the amount of a fine 
at will, and interpret the meaning of the term ''due in-
vestigation" at will. "Unworthiness'' is not a term 
which has been defined by a long series of judicial deci-
sions as has "negligence H. Whether a man is worthy 
or not to sell securities depends upon the individual ex-
perience or interpretation of the commission at the time 
of its order and even upon its whim and caprice. The 
Constitution does not permit our Legislature to delegate 
its legislative functions in this manner. 
The quotations made by appellants' brief under this 
topic do not stand for what they seem to say when taken 
out of their context. For example, the note to Meffert v. 
Packer, 1 L.R.A. (N. S.) 811, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247 is 
quoted, but the case itself does not use the term "un-
worthy" either in the statute or in its discussion. Even 
though the case itself were approved by this Court, it is 
not authority for the point urged by appellants. "Gross 
immorality" has a clearly limited social meaning well 
defined by custom which the term ''unworthy'' totally 
lacks. 
Re Hastings (Hartung's) Estate (Nevada, 160 Pac. 
782, cited on page 32 of appellants' brief involves the in-
terpretation of a will which uses the word ''unworthy.'' 
Manifestly, the interpretation of a will should not be used 
as an analogy to the requirement of definiteness of a term 
in a statute. 
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Alsup v. State, 238 S. W. 667, likewise bears no rela-
tionship to the problem of delegation of legislative power. 
It involved the guilt of a defendant in a criminal court 
under a statute defining as criminal libel a statement 
"that any person in office or a candidate therefor, is dis-
honest and therefore unworthy of such office ... " 
Clearly, under this statute the term "unworthy" was 
limited by the definable term "dishonest". The Court's 
attempted definition of the term "unworthy" illustrates 
the flexibility of the word. "Unworthy," said the Court, 
"means 'unbecoming,' 'discreditable,' 'not having suit-
able qualities or value,' 'beneath the character of.' " 
Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S. W. 586, a Texas case, is 
the only citation which even approaches the question in 
hand. That is the sole case which the author of the 
paragraph in 66 C. J. 63 (quoted on page 32 of appellants' 
brief) cites as authority for the paragraph. The case 
involved the cancellation of the certificate of a teacher by 
the superintendent of public instruction. The Court held 
that the term "unworthy" is so flexible that it is diffi-
cult for legislative enumeration and is therefore proper 
for an administrative body to interpret. Whatever per-
tinency the case has to the question at hand, certainly 
this holding is so contrary to fundamental conceptions 
that definite standards must be given to administrative 
bodies, and is so contrary to the attitude heretofore taken 
by this Court that it should not be used as authority. 
That Texas Court in its own definition shows how im-
possible it is to define "unworthy'' in any terms whieh 
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would serve as standards for an administrative body. 
It said: 
"The word 'unworthy' as used in common 
parlance, has a well-defined signification. As 
here used, it means the lack of 'worth'; the ab-
sence of those moral and mental qualities which 
are required to enable one to render the service 
essential to the accomplishment of the object 
which the law has in view. It may also include 
those positive traits of character which, notwith-
standing excellent educational attainments, unfit 
one to impart proper instruction to the young. To 
call one 'unworthy' is to impute moral delinquency 
to a degree of unfitness for the work in hand. 
There are many characteristics which may and 
should be considered in passing upon the issue of 
unworthiness in a teacher in the public schools. 
Different minds might reach different conclusions 
as to what qualities of character should render one 
unworthy to hold a certificate to teach. But there 
can be no difference of opinion about the fact that 
an unworthy person should not be permitted to 
teach in the public schools. What qualities, or 
lack of qualities, should render one unworthy 
,would be difficult for legislative enumeration. 
They are so numerous, and their combinations so 
varied in different individuals, that a statute 
which undertakes to be more specific would either 
be incomplete, or so flexible as to defeat the ends 
sought." (Italics added.) 
Such an argument has only one logical conclusion: 
That the Legislature must use such other terms 
than "unworthiness' to set a limitation upon the broad 
powers and discretion of the commission. 
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Clearly, Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection (4), of the Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, is an unlawful delegation of 
legislative power, and paragraph 12-c of the complaint 
which sets that out states a cause of action. 
B. The complaint alleged that the commission were 
wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of 
cancellation because the trOJnsaction on which the order 
is base.d is exempted by statute from the jurisdiction of 
the commission. (Paragraphs 12a, 23 of the complaint, 
Abs. 6, 11.) 
Sec. 82-1-5, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides: 
''Except as hereinafter otherwise expressly 
provided, the provisions of this chapter shall not 
apply to any of the following classes of securities: 
( 1) Any security issued or guaranteed by the 
United States or any territory or insular posses-
sion thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or 
by any State or political subdivision or agency 
thereof ... '' (Italics added.) 
Sec. 82-1-6 of the same statutes provides: 
''Except as hereinafter expressly provided, 
the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
the sale of any security in any of the following 
cases ... 
'' ( 3) An isolated transaction in which any 
security is sold, offered for sale, subscription or 
delivery by the owner thereof or by his represen-
tative for the owner's account, such sale or offer 
for sale, subscription or delivery not being made 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
in the course of repeated and successive transac-
tions of a like character by such owner or on his 
account by such representative, and such owner 
or representatiYe not being the underwriter of 
such security . . . ' ' 
Then follow exceptions to these exemptions which 
do not apply. 
Sec. 82-1-15 of the same statute provides: 
''X o dealer or salesman shall engage in busi-
ness in this state as such dealer or salesman, or 
sell any securities including securities exempted 
in Sec. 82-1-5 except in transactions exempt under 
Sec. 82-1-6 unless he has been registered as a 
dealer or salesman in the office of the commission 
pursuant to the provisions of this section.'' (Ital-
ics added.) 
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law as set 
forth in the complaint show better than any argument 
that ''all of the transactions'' mentioned in paragraph 
12a of the complaint and questioned in appellants' brief 
are all part and parcel of one single isolated transaction, 
to-wit, the refunding of the debt of the City of Mt. Pleas-
ant. This is an isolated transaction, and the respondent, 
as agent of the City, was exempted by Sec. 82-1-15 from 
the provisions of the chapter under which his registration 
was revoked. Paragraph 12a of the complaint states a 
cause of action. 
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C. The complaint alleged that the procedure before 
the Securities Commission was not a fair trial and de-
prived the plaintiff of due process of law. (Paragraphs 
4 to 11, 13 to 18; Abs. 2-6, 8-9.) 
It is fundamental that both in an administrative 
hearing and in a court a man who is being deprived of 
rights must have a fair hearing and be apprised in ad-
vance of the charges against him. The fact that the hear-
ing is before an administrative body does not excuse 
irregularities that have repeatedly been declared to de-
prive a defendant of his inalienable rights. Whether the 
restrictions to protect rights in the proceedings before 
an administrative body in a hearing criminal or quasi 
criminal in character such as this is, can be relaxed to 
any greater degree than can those in a court trial, and 
if so, to what degree, this Court has not yet decided, 
but it has decided that an irregular hearing vitiates an 
order. In McGreU' v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 
203, 85 Pac. 2d 608, the Industrial Commission conducted 
a hearing in an informal fashion as a public meeting. 
Opponents and proponents were alloted three hours each 
to talk about the matters. No witnesses were sworn and 
no record was made of their statements. The Supreme 
Court in condemning this said: 
''The legislature in requiring a full and public 
hearing had regard to judicial standards-not in 
a technical sense but in regards to fundamental 
requirements of fairness,-that one shall hear be-
fore one condemns, and that judgments shall be 
based on evidence-which are the essence of due 
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process in a proceeding of a judicial nature. Main-
taining of proper standards by administrative 
agencies charged with quasi-judicial or quasi-leg-
islative functions is of the highest importance and 
in the interest of the agency itself. Thus only 
can it maintain the confidence and respect essen-
tial to a proper performance of its duties. For 
these agencies, which necessarily multiply in our 
complex society,-to serve the purposes for which 
they are created and endowed with such vast 
power, they must accredit themselves by acting in 
harmony with the inbred concepts of fair play and 
the cherished traditions of a cautious, deliberate 
and judicious determination of the questions af-
fecting people's rights or liberties." 
For the Gibbs hearing before the Securities Com-
mission the plaintiff received as notice only an order 
which alleged fraud without detailing the facts consti-
tuting the fraud. No copy of the complaint was given 
him nor was the complainant at any time brought into 
the hearing and cross examined. 
In Dyment v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 
App: 260, 207 Pac. 409, there was filed with the Board of 
Examiners a complaint that Dyment had procured his 
certificate through fraud and misrepresentation. The 
Court of Appeal, speaking of the question whether a 
person in the administrative hearing might object to the 
sufficiency of the written charge lodged against him, 
said: 
''The right to present such a question in every 
form of action or proceeding, whether civil, crim-
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inal, or quasi-criminal is practically universal 
under the genius of Anglo-Saxon institutions, if 
not under all systems for the administration of 
justice. It may almost be said to be a natural 
right, for the idea that a man may be brought to 
trial upon an insufficient charge is opposed to the 
sense of justice inherent in the human breast ... 
''The complaint fails to state the facts con-
stituting the fraud and misrepresentation by 
means of which it is alleged that appellant pro-
cured his reciprocity certificate. The averment is 
that the person making the complaint 'charges 
Philip Dyment with having been guilty of unpro-
fessional conduct by violating section 14 of chap-
ter 354 of the Statutes of 1913 and acts amenda-
tory thereof of the state of California, in that he 
(Philip Dyment) procured by fraud and misrepre-
sentation a certificate to practice medicine and 
surgery in the state of California.' We are of the 
opinion that the complaint is insufficient. 
''It is of course, needless to cite authorities 
upon the proposition that neither as to pleadings 
nor as to evidence must the procedure in trials 
before medical boards be marked by the refine-
ments and subtleties which are characteristic of 
the conduct of actions in courts of law. The cases 
upon this point are both uniform and numerous. 
Still, gh:ing to the rule its full scope, a complaint 
in such a proceeding must give an alleged erring 
practitioner such no.tice of the nature of the 
charge against him as will enable him to formulate 
a defense. (Citing cases.) This the complaint 
now before us does not do. It is probably not 
possible to conceive of the many different prac-
tices by means of which an applicant fraudulently 
might procure the issuance to him of a certificate 
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licensing him to practice medicine and surgery, 
and a complaint against him for having brought 
such an attempt to fruition ought to notify him 
of the specific acts committed by him in the at-
tempt.'' 
The California Supreme Court approved this and de-
nied a hearing of this case, saying ( 207 Pac. 412) : 
" ... the complaint must be sufficient in its 
statement of facts to show actual unprofessional 
conduct by the person charged, or it will not give 
the board power or jurisdiction to revoke his cer-
tificate, and if a revocation is ordered on such a 
complaint the holder thereof may maintain a pro-
ceeding in certiorari to have it annulled for the 
want of jurisdiction of the hoard to make the 
order, as well where he did not make the objection 
to the board as where he did object." 
In Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac. 
942, the California Court of Appeal held that the Com-
missioner of Corporations acted without jurisdiction 
under the Corporate Securities Act, in revoking the cer-
tificate of a broker. The following notice had been sent 
to the broker by the Commissioner: ''You are hereby 
notified to appear at this office at 2:30p.m., on Friday, 
September 29, 1922, to show cause why your broker's 
certificate should not be revoked." The broker ap-
peared at the hearing by his attorney and after the hear-
ing the broker's certificate was suspended. The statute 
did not require any particular procedure, but the Court 
said: 
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"Applying the rule to the present case, it 
follows that, even though an attorney appeared 
for petitioner at the time noticed, the commis-
sioner would not have jurisdiction to make the 
order if the complaint or notice did not state facts 
showing that the petitioner had committed some 
breach within the purview of the act. This is so, 
not because the statute requires the filing of 
charges against the broker, but because the consti-
tutional guaranty of due process of law requires 
that he be allowed to appear and defend, and the 
established rules of procedure demand that the 
accused shall be given 'such notice of the nature of 
the charge against him as will enable him to form-
ulate a defense.' Dyment v. Board of Medical 
Examiners (Cal. App.), 207 Pac. 409, 411. The 
rule is particularly applicable here for two rea-
sons: (1) The proceeding is 'highly penal in its 
nature' (Schomig v. Keiser (Cal. App.) 209 Pac. 
550) ; and ( 2) the only conceivable ground of revo-
cation was based upon fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, and the accused should have been notified of 
the facts constituting the fraud or misrepresenta-
tion (Dyment v. Board of Med. Examiners (Cal. 
App.), 207 Pac. 409, 412). 
"(3) The notice mailed to the petitioner was 
merely an order to show cause why his certificate 
should not be revoked. It contained no charges 
·Of any nature and nothing from which he could 
ascertain what he would be required to defend. 
It was therefore insufficient to give the commis-
sioners any jurisdiction to either suspend or re-
voke the certificate.'' 
Like the proceeding before the California commis-
sion, this proceeding is highly penal in its nature, and 
deprives Mr. Gibbs of his rights of due process. 
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In State vs. Becker, 34 S. W. (2d) 27, the Missouri 
Court had a proceeding before it under a statute al-
most identical with Section 81-1-21 of the Utah Statutes 
under ·which the commission acted. That statute pro-
vided that "registration under section 22 may be re-
fused, or any registration granted may be revoked by 
the commissioner if, after a reasonable notice and a 
hearing the commissioner determines that such applicant 
or registrant so registered'': (then follow the five sub-
sections listed in the Utah Statute). Acting under this 
section the Missouri commissioner of securities caused 
to be served the following notice on the plaintiffs: 
"Whereas it has been charged that you and 
your agents have violated and are violating the 
provision of an act of the 55th General Assembly 
of Missouri" ... (here follows a detailed descrip-
tion of the act) ''and 
'' ''Vhereas, you have refused to cooperate 
with the Commissioner of Securities of the State 
of Missouri and his agents and representatives in 
the examination of your books, papers and records 
in order to determine whether or not you have or 
are now violating the Missouri Securities Act. 
'' 'You are therefore notified and directed to 
be and appear before the undersigned Commis-
sioner of Securities of the State of Missouri at 
room 204 in the State Capitol Building in the City 
of Jefferson, County of Cole and State of Mis-
souri, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on Thursday, the 15th 
day of May, 1930, then and there to produce for 
examination and use in evidence all of your books, 
papers and records in regard to and concerning 
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your transactions and sales of securities in the 
State of Missouri down the years 1929 and 1930 
in order that it may be ascertained and determined 
by said Commissioner whether or not you have 
violated or are now violating said act, and to show 
cause why your registration as a dealer in secur-
ities in the State of Missouri should not be re-
voked under the provisions of section 23 of said 
act for the causes named in paragraphs numbered 
1, 3 and 5 of said section, as provided by law.' 
The person aggrieved under that order brought an 
action in the lower court and the Supreme Court ruled 
that this notice was not reasonable notice under the stat-
ute, saying: 
''The notice is a double-barreled effort. It 
orders the production of books and papers and 
orders relators to show cause why their licenses 
should not be revoked under section 23 and causes 
named in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 of said section. 
It contains no charges, and the commissioner did 
not furnish such information. How could they 
show cause without official information as to the 
charges~ A hearing presupposes the existence of 
charges. There could be no hearing without 
charges. Therefore, it seems clear that the Legis-
lature intended 'reasonable notice' to include in-
formation as to the charges. If the words 'reason-
able notice' as used do not include such informa-
tion, then the section is in violation of the due 
process clause of the Constitution . . . '' (citing 
cases) "It must be presumed that the ~egislature, 
by providing in section 23 for a hearing on 'rea-
sonable notice,' did not intend to violate the Con-
stitution. 
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· · ": e understand respondents to concede that 
'reasonable notice' includes information as to the 
nature of the charges, but they contend that refer-
ence in the notice to certain paragraphs of section 
23 was 'reasonable notice' within the meaning of 
the section. \V e do not think so. One proceeded 
against under the section must be advised of the 
charges by 'reasonable notice.' It could not have 
been the intention of the Legislature that persons 
who might be proceeded against should carry with 
them pocket editions of the act that they might be 
advised of the charges by referring to the statute. 
The contemplated hearing without 'reasonable 
notice' is in excess of the commissioner's author-
ity, and our rule should be made absolute.'' 
Paragraph 4 of respondent's complaint sets forth 
the notice which was sent to respondent by the commis-
sion. Clearly, that notice is no more reasonable notice 
as required by the statute than was the notice set forth 
in the :Missouri case of State vs. Becker, supra. In fact, 
the Utah Securities Commission went even further and 
issued a suspension order without any notice whatever 
which operated immediately, although the statute speci-
fically provides that the revocation may be had only 
after ''a reasonable notice and a hearing.'' (Sec. 82-
1-21). That section in authorizing the suspension of the 
dealer's registration pending the hearing requires that 
such order shall state the cause for such suspension. 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint (Abs. 3) set forth 
the order and allege its insufficiency and illegality. The 
order states no cause. It says merely that the respond-
ent "has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection 
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with the sale of certain securities and has demonstrated 
its unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer in 
securities within the State of Utah.'' 
Appellants' brief suggests that the defect of lack of 
notice was cured by the bill of particulars. The com-
plaint, however, (Paragraph 8) alleges: 
''That the said so-called bill of particulars 
wholly failed to set forth facts sufficient to sup-
port or sustain in anywise the said order to show 
cause served upon the plaintiff herein by the 
defendants herein on August 12, 1939, as more 
particularly set forth in paragraph 4 hereof; that 
said bill of particulars failed to set forth facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against 
the plaintiff herein or to state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause for the suspension of the plain-
tiff from transacting business as a dealer in 
securities within the State of Utah, and particu-
larly failed to state facts sufficient to constitute 
fraud or any violation of law, either as set forth 
in said notice of August 12, 1939, or a:t all.'' 
Plaintiff in this case had to rely on a negative. It 
stated a fact, not a conclusion, that the bill of particulars 
lacked certain necessary allegations. If the defendants 
desired amplification and the setting forth in detail of 
the bill of particulars their procedure was to demur spe-
cially on this ground. The request could then have been 
easily complied with. Appellants cannot now rely upon 
their general demurrer to argue that the bill of particu-
lars was not set forth in the complaint. 
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Appellants cite In Re Burnette, 85 Pac. 575, 73 Kan. 
609, as authority that these revocation proceedings are 
not criminal actions. Yet even the Kansas court twice 
fo1md it necessary to qualify its decision of In Re Bur-
nette, supra. In In Re Smith, 73 Kan. 743, 85 Pac. 584, 
that court said: 
''While formal and technical pleading is not 
essential to this proceeding· it is important that 
the charges against an attorney shall be so specific 
as to fairly inform him of the precise nature of 
the misconduct with which he is accused. If the 
facts of the charged misconduct are clearly 
brought to his attention, the form in which they 
are stated and whether in 1 or 2 paragraphs is not 
of great importance ... Although the proceeding 
is not cri1ninal it is of such a nature and the 
jttdgment of disbarment is so severe and so direful 
in its results to an attorney that something more 
than a mere preponderance of proof is necessary." 
(Italics added.) 
Clearly this is more than a mere civil special proceeding. 
See also In Re TVilcox, 90 Kan. 646, 135 Pac. 995, in which 
the Kansas court holds that so far as awarding costs is 
concerned, a disbarment proceeding is an action rather 
than a special proceeding. 
Appellants' brief cites the Utah case of State vs. 
Cragun, 81 Utah 457, 20 Pac. (2d) 247. In that case 
Cragun was convicted in the district court for practicing 
obstetrics without a license. His license had prior to 
that trial been revoked by the department of registration, 
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and he had not appealed to the district court from that 
revocation. Instead, as a defense to the independent 
criminal action against him in the district court he urged 
that the proceedings of revocation before the depart-
ment were irregular. This Court, in affirming the con-
viction made clear that this defense was a collateral 
and not direct attack on the proceedings, and said: 
''A complaint may well be held insufficient to 
support a judgment when attacked in a direct pro-
ceeding, but held sufficient when attacked col-
laterally.'' 
The proceeding at bar, however, is a direct, not a 
collateral, attack upon the sufficiency of the revocation 
of the plaintiff's license, and the procedure followed 
therein. It is a direct attack upon the penal depriva-
tion of the plaintiff's right to engage in daily livelihood. 
In its discussion of the due process question, the ap-
pellants' brief cites People vs. Ha.sbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 
39 Pac. 918, and McCarty vs. Public Service Commission, 
94 Utah 304, 77 Pac. (2d) 331, as alleged authority for 
the statement that administrative boards are not courts 
and their acts cannot be tested by reference to judicial 
codes. This Court, however, has definitely held that 
these administrative bodies, in the exercise of their 
function in revoking licenses, are acting in a judicial ca-
pacity. In Baker vs. Department of Registration, 78 
Utah 424, 3 Pac. (2d) 1082, this Court said: 
'' rrhe right to practice medicine is a valuable 
property right, and the procePding to revoke surh 
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right is essentially the exercise of a judicial func-
tion. \Yhile the department of registration is pri-
marily an administrative body, it exercises judi-
cial functions when it undertakes to hear and 
determine whether or not a license of a physician 
and surgeon shall be revoked. It is while exer-
cising such function essentially a tribunal.'' 
This complaint raises the objection that in its exer-
cise of the judicial po,ver the commission failed to follow 
the procedure necessary to give the defendant the rights 
which he is guaranteed by the Constitution, of a fair trial 
in this criminal or quasi criminal proceeding. While it 
is not necessary that the code procedure set out for 
courts be strictly followed by the commission, still the 
commission's procedure must be such that the inherent 
rights of the accused to a fair trial are preserved. The 
complaint says that this was not done, and in so say-
ing states a cause of action. 
We have already discussed the failure of the com-
mission to give proper notice, alleged as a cause of action 
in the complaint. In addition to that, the complaint al-
leges in paragraph 9 that the plaintiff was not informed 
as to the defendants' informant nor confronted with the 
informant or complaining witness. This Court has al-
ready ruled that in the absence of statutory authority 
depositions cannot be taken in these administrative hear-
ings, that it is necessary to have the direct testimony of 
the ·witnesses. M oormeister vs. Golding, 84 Utah 324, 
27 Pac. (2d) 447). In a hearing which has for its pur-
pose the depriving of the respondent of his means of live-
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lihood and which the authorities we have already cited 
affirm is the equivalent of a criminal hearing, the per-
son whose registration is being revoked surely has a fun-
damental right to know who the complaining witness is 
and to have the opportunity to cross examine that wit-
ness. 
The complaint, then, states a cause of action in al-
leging that the plaintiff was deprived in the hearing of 
due process of law by the irregularities of the hearing. 
It sets forth the following irregularities, all of which 
taken together constitute such a lack of fundamental 
procedure of justice in a judicial or quasi judicial pro-
ceeding that it should be severely condemned: 
1. The suspension order failed to state the facts 
of the accusation. (Complaint, Par. 4, Abs. 2.) 
2. The suspension order failed to state facts sus-
taining the accusation. (Complaint Par. 5 and 6, Abs. 
3 and 4.) 
3. The suspension order was issued contrary to 
law. (Complaint, Par. 6, Abs. 4.) 
4. The bill of particulars failed to set forth facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Complaint, 
Par. 7, 8, 11, Abs. 4, 5, 6.) 
5. The plaintiff was not informed as to defend-
ant's informant and was not confronted with the com-
plaining witness. (Complaint, Par. 9, Abs. 5.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
6. The commission in arriving at its findings and 
conclusions acted irregularly in having the transcript of 
only one side before it. (Complaint, Par. 13, Abs. 8.) 
D. The conzpla int alleged a total lack of jttstification for 
the commission's order in plaintiff's acts pri-or to the 
hearing and as adduced a.t the hearing, and in the whole 
procedure. (Paragraphs 15 to 18, 21, 22, Abs. 8-10.) 
In the second main section of this brief we shall 
discuss the question whether the procedure authorized by 
the statute constitutes an appeal and a review of the 
decision of the commission or an independent action. 
If it does constitute an appeal, paragraphs 14 to 18 of 
the complaint themselves state a cause of action because 
they set forth the grounds necessary for an appeal from 
this order of the commission : 
1. That the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are contrary to and not supported by the issues raised 
by the order to show cause, the order of suspension, the 
bill of particulars, or the amended bill of particulars. 
2. That the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are not supported by, are in conflict with, and go be-
yond the evidence adduced at the hearing. 
3. That the conclusions of law are not supported by 
the findings of fact and are contrary to law. 
4. That the conclusions of law are contrary to the 
evidence and to the findings of fact and are contrary 
to law. 
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5. That the order of cancellation IS contrary to 
law. 
On the other hand, if this procedure is not an ap-
peal but is an independent action, the important allega-
tion of the complaint against the commission by the per-
son aggrieved is that there are no grounds for revoca-
tion. This is necessarily a statement of fact because it 
involves a negative. Paragraph 21 of the complaint is a 
sufficient allegation of this negative: 
"That the plaintiff herein has committed no 
act in the sale, purchase or exchange of securities 
either of commission or omission which in anywise 
justifies or sustains the final order of cancellation 
of registration of the plaintiff as a dealer in se-
curities, dated November 8, 1939, or at all, and is 
entitled to have said order of cancellation set 
aside and revoked and its registration as a dealer 
in securities reinstated." 
In addition to this allegation the complaint alleges 
that the attorney general conceded that there was no 
charge of actual fraud and no evidence of actual fraud, 
and that it was further admitted that there was no fraud 
on the part of the plaintiff herein nor any intent to de-
fraud, and that no evidence was adduced either on behalf 
of the plaintiff or commission in any wise showing any 
fraud or intent to defraud. The appellants' brief at-
tempts to belittle this allegation by the statement that 
the attorney general sat as a member of the commission 
and his remarks would not be binding on the other two 
members of the commission. The appellants forget that 
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the attorney general "·as not only a member of the com-
mission judging the respondent, but was also, through 
his assistant, the attorney prosecuting the action. 
Whether or not his remarks would be binding on him as 
judge, they bind him as prosecutor. The admission was 
actually made by the present attorney general who was 
then the assistant attorney general prosecuting the case. 
Admissions of an attorney in open hearing during its 
progress are of course conclusive upon his client. The 
attorney general, acting as attorney, cannot now say in 
his brief that it was not as attorney, but as judge that 
he made the admissions charged in the complaint. This 
attempt illustrates one of the many dangers of a .system 
in which representatives of the same office act both as 
prosecutor and judge. Unless our courts hold a strict 
rein on commission practices, what advantages there are 
of the commission system will be lost in a deprivation 
of personal liberty. We believe this court will not per-
mit the practices alleged in respondent's complaint to go 
unchecked. 
II. The Court below and the Plaintiff and Respond-
. ent followed the proper and statutory proce-
dure (Assignments I, II, and fll, and Special 
Demurrer, Assignment IV). 
The appellants question the Court's procedure in 
suspending ex parte the revocation order of the Securi-
ties Commission, in authorizing respondent to continue 
to do business as a licensed dealer pending final determin-
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ation by the Court of the action, and in failing to require 
security pending this determination. 
This is an objection to the procedure of the Court 
which the appellants attempt to raise by their First, 
Second and Third assignments and by their special de-
murrer discussed under their Fourth assignment. The 
action was brought under Sec. 82-1-41, Rev. Stat. 1933, 
which reads as follows : 
''Any person directly affected and aggrieved 
by any final order of the Commission made under 
any of the provisions of this title may, within 30 
days after notice of such order, institute an ac-
tion in the district court of the county at the seat 
of government against the Commission, setting 
out his grievance and right to complain. In its 
answer the Commission may set out any matter 
in justification; and the court shall determine the 
issues on both questions of law and fact, and may 
affirm, set aside or modify the order complained 
of." 
This section contemplates one of two procedures, 
under either one of which the Court's action is proper. 
1. An appeal to the district court from the com-
mission's order involving a trial de novo on the record. 
2. An action reviewing the decision of the commis-
sion by the taking of testimony anew in the district court. 
An analysis of the section of the statute will show 
that the Court's action was proper under either of these 
theories. 
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It is self-evident that if the trial in the district court 
is a review of the action of the commission upon the 
record, it was proper for the Court to order a transcript 
of that record of the commission brought before it. In 
D. &; R. G. W. R. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 98 
Utah 431, 100 Pac. (2d) 552, this Court held that the 
procedure set forth in Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
Sec. 9, involves a trial de novo upon the record. Sec. 82-
1-41, set forth above, is similar in the following respects 
to the act interpreted in the D. &; R. 0. W. case. Both 
provide that any person aggrieved by the action of the 
commission may, within thirty days after notice of the 
decision, bring an action in the district court. Both pro-
vide that the person aggrieved shall be plaintiff and the 
commission defendant. The act interpreted in the D. 
&; R. G. W. case provides that the action shall be a "plen-
ary review" of the action of the commission; while Sec. 
82-1-41 says that the Court "may affirm, set aside, or 
modify the order complained of.'' ''To review an action 
is to study or examine it again,'' this Court stated in 
that case. To "examine, set aside or modify the order" 
of the commission limits the district court to the order 
complained of. We believe that this contemplates a re-
view of the proceedings and that the interpretation of 
this court in the D. & R. G. W. R. Co. case should apply. 
In an appeal from the commission to the district 
court the parties in the absence of statute are put into 
the position that they were in before the order of the 
commission. This Court has so ruled in M oorrneister vs. 
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Golding, Director of Registration Department, 84 Utah 
324, 27 Pac. (2d) 447: 
''The general rule is, unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute, that an appeal, where the case is 
triable de novo, vacates the judgment appealed 
from ... 
"It will be noted from our statute in the case 
of an appeal from a judgment or order made by 
the department of registration revoking a license 
to the district court, it makes no provision what-
soever for the necessity of giving a supersedeas 
bond to stay the judgment appealed from. There 
is no provision in the statute whatever keeping 
the judgment effective pending the appeal. This 
being so, the general rule would seem to apply. 
This would be true, regardless of whether the 
judgment may be considered as self-executing, or 
whether it was not, because in the absence of a 
statute to the contrary, the appeal vacates it. 
Hence the effect of an appeal from a judgment, 
or order, of the department of registration revok-
ing the license, leaves the parties in the same 
situation with reference to the rights involved as 
they were prior to the rendition of revocation of 
license.'' 
This ruling is directly contrary to the argument of 
appellants, who claim that the natural and logical con-
clusion is that the legislature intended orders of such 
bodies to stand until found unlawful. 
If, then, the Court was acting under the first theory 
that this action in the district court is a trial de novo 
on the record of the action of the Commission, it did ex-
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actly what this Court has said is contemplated in an ap-
peal to the district court in such a case: (1) It ordered 
a transcript of the record so that it could review it on 
the facts as well as on the law; (2) it suspended the 
order of the commission and placed the parties in the 
status they were in before the order of the commission, 
and it permitted this without a supersedeas bond. 
If we look at the statute under the second theory, 
to-wit, that the procedure outlined there contemplates 
the taking of new evidence under new issues, we find that 
under this theory the Court acted likewise in conformity 
to the statute. It is significant that the section of the 
statute limits the action in the Court to a decision on the 
ruling of the commission. Clearly, the commission's 
order is the subject matter of the action. The ''aggrieved 
party'' is the plaintiff. The commission, which by its 
action has caused the grievance, is the defendant. What 
is the grievance to set up in the pleading~ Primarily, 
of course, the order itself. Secondarily, the lack of jus-
tification for the order both in lack of evidence to sub-
stantiate the findings and in the procedure which violates 
the rights of the plaintiff. Appellants urge that under 
a new trial in which evidence is taken, the procedure of 
the commission is immaterial, and that it was therefore 
improper to allege them. If this were so, the allega-
tions in the complaint objecting to the high-handed pro-
cedure of the commission might be superflous, and might 
be stricken by proper motions. But they cannot he reached 
by defendants' general demurrer, and are harmless. A 
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copy of the transcript under this theory might not be 
necessary, but an order requiring it would at the most 
be harmless error. The better view, however, should be 
that an action brought for the purpose of determining 
whether the district court should affirm, set aside, or 
modify the order of the Commission, necessarily should 
have before it all the facts leading to the making of the 
order by the Commission-including the commission's 
procedure-whether these facts are presented by a full 
transcript of the proceedings or by testimony showing 
what the proceedings were. 
If this section requires the taking of evidence, could 
the Court cancel the order of the commission pending the 
hearing¥ Courts have an inherent right in equity to 
prevent a hardship on the plaintiff pending the outcome 
of the trial. In addition to this inherent right it receives 
statutory powers. Section 20-7-25, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, provides : 
"When jurisdiction is, by statute, conferred 
on a court or judicial officer, all means necessary 
to carry it into effect are also given; and in the 
exercise of jurisdiction, if the course of proceed-
ing is not specifically pointed out by statute, any 
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be 
adopted which may appear most conformable to 
the spirit of the statute or of the codes of pro-
cedure.'' 
This Court has heretofore held justifiable under 
these powers even in the absence of specific statutory 
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authority an order requiring a garnishee to open a safety 
deposit box ( TT" est Cache Sugar Company vs. Hendrick-
son, 56 Utah 327, 190 Pac. 946), and an order to a mort-
gagee to dispose of perishable goods pending foreclosure 
(Watts vs. Greenwood, 49 Utah 118, 162 Pac. 72). And 
in Baker vs. Department of Registration, 78 Utah 424, 
3 Pac. (2d) 1082. this Court said, speaking of itself: 
'' "\Vhile the cases just cited from this juris-
diction deal with the power of a court to, in the 
absence of legislative provisions, prescribe pro-
ceedings in a complaint pending before it, there is 
nothing in the language of section 1813 [now 20-
7-23] which limits the power of the court to such 
cases. The statute applies alike in all cases where 
jurisdiction is conferred by statute without regard 
to whether such jurisdiction is original or ap-
pellate ... 
''Thus, in the absence of any specific legisla-
tive provision regulating the procedure that shall 
be followed in appeals from a judgment or order 
of the director of the department of registration 
in revoking or refusing to revoke the license of a 
physician and surgeon, this court has the author-
ity, and it is its duty, to direct the procedure that 
shall be followed.'' 
This Court has already held that in the absence of 
statutory requirements to the contrary an appeal to the 
district court vacates the order of the commission ap-
pealed from. M oormeister vs . .Golding, supra. Just so, 
we submit the district court has the power to stay the 
harm ·which would be done by an invalid order pending 
the final determination of the question whether or not 
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that order is valid. The commission's revocation of this 
respondent's registration was drastic in its effect. It 
deprived Mr. Gibbs of his means of daily livelihood. 
Though unquestionably the matter should be one for a 
speedy determination by the Court, the record shows 
that in this case over one year elapsed between the filing 
of plaintiff's complaint and the ruling by the district 
judge on defendants' demurrer thereto. Clearly, the 
prevention by the administrative body of the respond-
ents' right to practice a livelihood for such a period of 
time and longer is a hardship which should be prevented 
by the Court when an issue is raised by the complaint 
that the commission acted wrongfully or beyond its power 
in revoking the registration. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the complaint, which 
set forth the irregularities of the commission in revok-
ing the respondent's registration, stated a cause of ac-
tion, and that the Court in staying the effect of this revo-
cation until after proper review of this administrative 
act by the courts acted not only within its powers but 
within its duties. 
I. The plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. 
A. The complaint alleged that the commission were 
wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of 
cancellation because Title 82, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
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1933, and particularly Sec. 82-1-21, Subsection ( 4) thereof, 
is contrary to law and unconstitutional. 
B. The complaint alleged that the commission were 
wholly without jurisdiction to enter their final order of 
cancellation because the transaction on which the order 
is based is exempted by statute from the jurisdiction of 
the commission. 
C. The complaint alleged that the procedure before 
the Securities Commission was not a fair trial and de-
prived the plaintiff of due process of law. 
D. The complaint alleged a total lack of justifica-
tion for the commission's order prior to the hearing, 
adduced at the hearing and in the whole procedure. 
II. The Court below and the plaintiff and respond-
ent followed the proper and statutory procedure. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Plaintiff. 
720 Newhouse Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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